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Abstract
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have plagued
the Internet for decades, but defenses have not fundamentally
outpaced attackers. Instead, the size and rate of growth in at-
tacks have actually outpaced carriers’ and DDoS mitigation
services’ growth. In this paper, we comprehensively exam-
ine ways in which Named Data Networking (NDN), a pro-
posed data-centric Internet architecture, fundamentally ad-
dresses some of the principle weaknesses in today’s DDoS
defenses in IP networking. We argue that NDN’s architec-
tural changes (even when incrementally deployed) can make
DDoS attacks fundamentally more difficult to launch and
less effective.
We present a new DDoS mitigation solution – Fine-
grained Interest Traffic Throttling FITT, to leverage NDN’s
features to combat DDoS in the Internet of Things (IoT)
age. FITT enables the network to detect DDoS directly from
feedback from victims, throttle DDoS traffic along its ex-
act path in the network, and perform reinforcement control
over the misbehaving entities at their sources. In cases like
the Mirai attacks, where smart IoT devices (smart cameras,
refrigerators, etc.) were able to cripple high-capacity ser-
vice providers using diverse DDoS Tactics Techniques and
Procedures (TTPs), FITT would be able to precisely squelch
the attack traffic at its distributed sources, without disrupting
other legitimate application traffic running on the same de-
vices. FITT offers an incrementally deployable solution for
service providers to effectuate the application-level remedi-
ation at the sources, which remains unattainable in today’s
DDoS market. Our extensive simulations results show that
FITT can effectively throttle attack traffic in a short time and
achieve over 99% legitimate traffic.
1 Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have plagued
the Internet for decades, and often capitalize on inherent
properties of today’s TCP/IP networking model. Starting
with early DDoS examples (e.g., attacks from the Trin00
botnet in 1999 [13]) through to recent attacks from the Mi-
rai botnet [6], the remediation techniques used suggest that
our defensive tactics may not be fundamentally keeping pace
with attackers. Rather, with attacking botnets swelling in
size to hundreds of thousands, and even millions, attacks
have grown large enough that their attack volume rivals pro-
visioned capacity of DDoS mitigation providers. The Mi-
rai botnet serves as a quintessential example, in that it was
used to launch some of the largest DDoS attacks in history,
and it did so using compromised devices that primarily in-
cluded Internet of Things (IoT) devices and household ap-
pliances that were both easily discoverable and poorly pro-
tected [6]. In many noteworthy modern instances, DDoS has
evolved to being more distributed than ever and to using in-
creasingly application-level semantics (e.g. reflective am-
plification attacks using DNS, NTP, memcached, etc.). Ser-
vice operators, providers, and mitigation services [2, 31, 14]
have had little recourse but to centralize defenses and back-
haul and disrupt application semantics of malicious traf-
fic, or to absorb undisrupted attack traffic (“packet love”)
in large DDoS mitigation service networks. In efforts to
meet the distributed threat posed by DDoS with distributed
remediation in incrementally deployable ways, approaches
like BGP’s FlowSpec [27], Remote Triggered Back-Holing
(RTBH) [23], etc. have attempted to coordinate defenses
at the network-level. However, DDoS Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures (TTPs) are sufficiently nuanced as to need
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and network-level remedia-
tion lacks the necessary expressiveness to encode the TTPs
in network-level remediations. This has, therefore, led to
collateral damage or lack of adoption of these protocols and
techniques.
In this paper, we show that a new incrementally deploy-
able technique can be within our reach. We examine the
Named Data Networking (NDN) [39] (Figure 1) to investi-
gate whether DDoS defense can benefit from its architectural
changes. NDN changes the basic network communication
model and directly brings application-layer data names to
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Figure 1: TCP/IP Architecture and NDN
the network layer: instead of pushing packets to an IP, in an
NDN network users request named Data packets by sending
Interest packets that carry the desired data name (Figure 2).
The network forwarders will record the state of Interest pack-
ets, making breadcrumb traces for returning requested data
packets. This stateful forwarding provides abundant traffic
insights. These two key designs make NDN itself harder to
be DDoS attacked and provide a solid foundation for DDoS
defense mechanisms, which can be effective with incremen-
tal rollout of NDN. We argue that the architectural changes
of the network, even with incremental deployment, can make
DDoS attacks fundamentally more difficult to launch and
less effective.
Content Name
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Nonce and other 
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Content Name
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Content
Signature
Figure 2: NDN Interest packet and Data packet
NDN’s receiver-driven model eliminates attacks by data
packets, however attackers may attack a target in an NDN
network by flooding various types of Interest packets. To ad-
dress this attack vector, we present an NDN DDoS mitigation
solution – Fine-grained Interest Traffic Throttling (FITT)
that leverages NDN’s semantically meaningful names and
stateful forwarding to combat Interest DDoS attacks. As we
show later in this paper, FITT achieves the following desir-
able goals:
• Direct DDoS detection by feedback from the victim.
• Fine-grained traffic throttling at distributed sources on the
specific attacking traffic flows at application level.
• Reinforcement control to further distinguish attack traffic
and minimize the collateral damage to legitimate traffic.
In section 6, we elaborate how today’s service providers can
deploy NDN with FITT incrementally over the existing net-
work infrastructure to mitigate DDoS. We posit that the IoT
industry (a major source of Mirai attack traffic) may even be
incentivized to lead this deployment, and thereby poised to
offer de facto Internet-wide benefits. Indeed, finding opera-
tionally feasible security models and incentives to secure IoT
devices have been an open research challenge [20, 42].
The contributions of this paper are twofold.
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first com-
prehensive description of how NDN’s architectural design
decisions lead to an inherently resilient foundation for
DDoS defense.
• We propose a specific solution, FITT, to mitigate DDoS
attacks more accurately than existing solutions for TCP/IP
networks. We also compared FITT with other proposed
countermeasures for NDN and other Information Centric
Network (ICN) architectures to explain its superioty.
Our analysis illustrates that the network can do more to pro-
tect application services than we currently expect. By recon-
sidering the architectural design, we can augment network
security in a fundamental way: let applications instruct the
network to squelch DDoS at its sources.
2 DDoS Mitigation over TCP/IP Architecture
2.1 DDoS and Vulnerabilities in IP
Many of the largest volumetric DDoS attacks that we have
seen today rely on architectural properties of TCP/IP. For ex-
ample, the Mirai botnet was used to generate unprecedented
DDoS traffic volume, causing millions of dollars (in losses
and mitigation service costs). In part, this seems to derive
from the large numbers of sources that are relatively easy to
compromise: IP address enumeration and scanning trivial-
ize the discovery of poorly protected IoT devices, which can
then be used to build the biggest botnet ever. Another exam-
ple is that reflective amplification attacks capitalize on source
address spoofing and redirect traffic to any IP addresses [6].
DDoS attacks have large variances in their TTPs and com-
bating them is often done by application-level remediation
(in scrubbing systems, appliances, app configurations, etc.)
Previous works [22, 11, 37, 19, 33] have observed that
DDoS attacks often exploit the following properties in IP:
• Push-model Communication: Any Internet node can send
packets to any other IP address.
• Destination-based Delivery: Packet delivery is solely
based on the destination address and there is no source ad-
dress validation by default, thus source IP addresses can
easily be misattributed.
• Limited Expressiveness in IP Forwarding: IP’s forward-
ing system cannot embody the semantic characteristics of
application-level traffic, which makes it difficult for DDoS
defense mechanisms to inspect DDoS attacks.
Based on these observations of IP networking, [19, 11]
propose modifications to the existing Internet architecture
to have greater DDoS resilience at an architectural level. A
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number of desired features of a DDoS-resistant Internet ar-
chitecture are presented, the major ones include (i) limiting
the accessbility to a server based on the server’s capabilities,
(ii) source address authentication to prevent source address
spoofing, (iii) separating client and server address space to
prevent unwanted traffic from client to client and server to
server, and (iv) building symmetric traffic flows to prevent
reflection attacks at the network layer. In this paper, our ex-
amination of NDN in Section 3 shows that NDN’s architec-
ture natively embodies these notions.
2.2 Network-centric DDoS Mitigation
Deployable filter-based network-level remediation ap-
proaches in TCP/IP like FlowSpec [27], RTBH [23], the
IETF’s Distributed Open Threat Signaling (dots) Working
Group [29] etc., lack the necessary expressiveness of DDoS’s
TTPs. Such mechanisms would additionally require Deep
Packet Inspection (DPI) to gain insight into the ongoing
traffic which IP’s stateless forwarding cannot provide. For
instance, black-hole filtering blacklists entire network pre-
fixes, which can cause collateral damage to: well-behaved
sources, non-attack traffic that is sourced from compromised
devices, etc. As another example, FlowSpec requires the
proper n-tuple consisting of several matching criteria so that
DDoS traffic can be classified; however, since most sup-
ported matching criteria is at the network layer (e.g., IPv4,
IPv6, ICMP), FlowSpec can mistakenly drop legitimate traf-
fic to other services deployed on the same victim server or
block good traffic sent from the compromised bots.
Ioannidis and Bellovin proposed router-based Push-
back [21] which utilizes a heuristics function to detect pack-
ets that probably belong to an attacker by checking the “con-
gestion signature” (e.g., source/destination addresses) of the
traffic. Due to routers’ coarse-grained inspection of traffic,
the filtering can lead to collateral damage.
Another interesting work is Active Internet Traffic Filter-
ing (AITF) [8], which requires the routers on the path of at-
tacking traffic to mark traffic flows with route records (RRs),
which are the IP addresses of routers who have forwarded
the flow. In this way, the victim can report the unexpected
flows to the network, and routers can filter the flows identi-
fied by the RRs. However, this may potentially cause dam-
age to (i) all the traffic (both attack traffic and legitimate)
sent along the path, because RRs cannot distinguish applica-
tion-level flows, and (ii) legitimate hosts who are under the
same first hop network as the attackers, because routers do
not have fine-grain state to identify exact senders.
Some other network-based works like StopIt [26] and
SIFF [36] require additional features that are missing in
the existing TCP/IP architecture. For example, SIFF intro-
duces privileged communication, which requires additional
information carried by the IP header and each router on the
connection path marking IP packets. Capability-based ap-
proaches like TVA (Traffic Validation Architecture) [37, 25]
introduce authentication of the packet source into the net-
work system. Taking TVA as an example, by embedding
cryptographic authentication info into the IP packet, the rout-
ing system and servers are able to distinguish legitimate
users from “bad” ones. The primary difficulties in opera-
tionally deploying these proposed solutions are adding extra
functionality into the deployed TCP/IP architecture and an
incentive misalignment similar to Pushback.
3 NDN’s Properties for DDoS Mitigation:
A Comprehensive Examination
3.1 Named Data Networking
Named Data Centric Named Data Networking (NDN)
makes named data the thin waist of the network architecture.
More specifically, applications name their data at the appli-
cation layer and NDN directly uses the namespace of appli-
cations for network layer data delivery. These data names
are semantically meaningful and structured, e.g., a video
produced by Alice’s device may have the name “/univ1/cs
/alice/video.mp4”. In NDN, routing and forwarding the
packets are based on name prefixes. Figure 3 shows a simple
illustration of how an Interest packet is forwarded to fetch
the data.
The 
Internet
/univ1 /univ1/cs
Interest
/univ1
/cs/alice
Data
Data 
Consumer
Hit Cache?
Hit Cache?
Hit Cache?
The Interest has a name “/univ1/cs/alice/video/demo.mp4”. Each
forwarder along the path forwards the Interest packet based on the
forwarding information table (FIB) using the longest prefix match.
Figure 3: Data Fetching with an Interest
Stateful Forwarding NDN utilizes a stateful forwarding
plane: forwarders will record each Interest packet toward
data sources, and the fetched Data packet will strictly fol-
low, in reverse, the path taken by the corresponding Interest
to get back to the requesting entity. Since an NDN network
concerns about data instead of locations, multiple Interest
packets requesting the same Data packet are merged in the
network (called Interest Aggregation).
NDN’s forwarding module realizes stateful forwarding by
introducing a Pending Interest Table (PIT) into each router.
The PIT stores currently unsatisfied (pending) Interests to-
gether with their incoming/outgoing interfaces. When a Data
packet arrives, the router sends the Data packet to all incom-
ing interfaces recorded in the corresponding PIT entry and
removes this PIT entry; the replied Data can be cached in
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the router’s Content Store (CS) to satisfy future Interests re-
questing the same piece of data.
In addition to Interest and Data packets, either NDN
routers or data producers may generate NACK packets,
which serve as a hop-by-hop feedback mechanism to report
a problem in further forwarding of Interests. When a router
receives such a NACK packet, it takes appropriate action(s)
based on reason code carried in the NACK packet.
NDN Forwarding Daemon (NFD)
Content
Store PIT FIB
Interest
Data
Forwarding Strategy
T
1. Hit Cache?
2. Find Matching 
PIT Entry?
3. Find Matching 
FIB?
F F T
Data
a. Find Matching PIT Entry?
b. Cache
c. Forward
Figure 4: NDN Forwarding
Built-in Security NDN builds communication security [41]
into the architecture by requiring data producers to crypto-
graphically sign all data packets at the time of production
and, if needed for content confidentiality, encrypt them as
well. Securing data packets directly enables routers to cache
them as they pass along, and enables consumers to validate
Data packet regardless of where and how they are fetched.
3.2 NDN’s DDoS Mitigation Properties
In this section, we examine NDN’s architectural advantages
over DDoS defenses in the TCP/IP architecture in terms
of DDoS resiliency. We identify the following advantages:
(i) NDN’s Interest-Data packet exchange eliminates net-
work-layer reflection attacks and DDoS attacks by flooding
Data packets. (ii) Its data pull model and securing data di-
rectly make it more difficult for attackers to recruit “zombie
armies”. (iii) NDN’s Interest aggregation and cache automat-
ically relieve the overload caused by Interests for static and
existent Data. (iv) NDN’s stateful forwarding provides rich
insights into ongoing traffic for DDoS defense mechanisms.
3.2.1 Off By Design
For devices that serve content in TCP/IP servers, DDoS
threats begin as soon as a service goes online and becomes
reachable. By contrast, the communication in NDN follows
a pull model and an application or a node is considered as
“off by design” [11] for the following reasons: 1. One can-
not send an Interest to a consumer application, or a producer
application whose name is unreachable from the sender. By
simply not announcing its prefix to solicit Interest packets,
an application can still pull data from others, but can not be
reached by an Interest packet, thus reducing the attack sur-
face for malcode infections and for DDoS attackers. 2. A
Data packet cannot go anywhere if it is not requested, be-
cause there is no corresponding Interest path. 3. Flow-parity:
one Interest can at most bring one Data packet back. With
the pull model, an attacker cannot launch DDoS by flooding
Data packets, thus network layer DDoS attacks can only be
carried out by Interest flooding. However, unlike in TCP/IP,
as Data Packets follow the reverse path of their correspond-
ing Interests, an attacker cannot redirect them to another con-
sumer. By design NDN fundamentally eliminates reflection
DDoS attacks at the network layer.
3.2.2 Data Name Instead of IP Address
In TCP/IP, even clients who do not run services can be at-
tacked, compromised, and enslaved. One very common in-
trusion TTP of attackers is to scan the IP address space in
order to discover devices, and then compromise them. In
NDN, however, if an end device does not serve data, it does
not even need a name and can eliminate the attack surface of
being exposed at all. More so, routers in NDN forward an
Interest by its name. NDN names are defined by the appli-
cation semantics in an arbitrary format that are not enumer-
able. For example, a smart home device with an application-
defined name “/my/name/home/refrigerator-02” is less ex-
posed compared with an IP address with a default port num-
ber, like Mirai exploits [7], because in NDN the exposed net-
work prefix may only be “/my/name” and “guessing” the ex-
act name requires reconnaissance. If an Interest name does
not match a specific prefix in the forwarding table, the packet
will get dropped by the router. Using application-defined
names fundamentally makes a source more difficult to be
found and then compromised.
Another big benefit of using a name is to allow the net-
work to inspect traffic at a much finer granularity. For ex-
ample, a compromised smart home refrigerator, in a Mirai
botnet, may be carrying out network transactions with its
device-manufacturer while also being forced to participate
in a DDoS attack. There, the legitimate Interest traffic might
have prefix “/iot-provider/service” and attacking traffic
might be towards prefix “/univ1/service/email”. Since
names of data are directly exposed to the network, the infras-
tructure is able to identify specific application-level traffic
flows and squelch just them (and not the legitimate traffic).
3.2.3 Reduce DDoS traffic with Cached Data and Inter-
est Aggregation
NDN’s content-centric communication model provides en-
hanced data availability by enabling caching inside the net-
work (i.e. the CS in NDN Forwarders). Because of the in-
network caching, Data packets carrying static content (e.g.
HTML files, CSS files, images) can be cached by routers to
satisfy future Interest packets, thus reducing the number of
Interests reaching the producer (victim).
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In addition, Interests targeting the same piece of the
named data will be aggregated by the router and later Interest
packets will not be sent out. This feature makes it harder for
DDoS attackers to flood the same Interest packet or a small
set of Interest packets towards the producer in a short time.
As shown in previous work [32] and our simulation results
in Section 7.1, in-network caching and Interest aggregation
help to mitigate the Interest flooding where attackers send
Interests for static or existing Data packets. However, if at-
tackers flood a target prefix with a large set of Interest pack-
ets or even fake Interests with randomly generated compo-
nents, the benefits will diminish. This is because churn and
evictions in the cache will lead to diminishing cache hit-rates
and the chance of two attacking Interests sharing the same
name drops. However, it is also noteworthy that NDN is
incrementally deployable and does not immediately require
rich deployment and caching in the routed core of networks
in order to function properly.
3.2.4 Rich Traffic Insight by Stateful Forwarding
As NDN’s deployment pervades more of the routing infras-
tructure, its stateful forwarding [38] provides rich insight
into ongoing traffic. Different from a router in TCP/IP, which
has little knowledge about which downstream interface at-
tackers are behind, stateful forwarding in NDN helps for-
warders to know exactly which interface the traffic is com-
ing in from, by design. This helps NDN traceback to misbe-
having clients and reinforces mitigation. By observing each
Data packet and its corresponding pending Interest entry in
the PIT, an NDN forwarder is able to measure the round-trip
time, throughput, and name reachability of each outgoing in-
terface. As mentioned in [1, 15], a forwarder can also learn
the Interest satisfaction ratio, namely the proportion of Inter-
ests that successfully fetched a Data packet, and thus detect
possible fake Interest DDoS attacks. Moreover, PIT entry
timeouts also offer relatively cheap DDoS attack detection,
as mentioned in [39].
3.3 A taxonomy of DDoS attack using NDN
Interests
In NDN, attackers can only attempt to DDoS a target by
flooding it with Interests. Specifically, inspired by the
work [18], we categorize Interest packets used in DDoS at-
tacks into I-1, I-2, and I-3 according to (i) whether the In-
terest is valid or not and (ii) whether the target Data requires
the producer to generate data in real time. Among the three
types, I-1 and I-3 Interests are valid Interests because they
can fetch a Data back in theory while I-2 Interests are fake
Interests.
I-1: Valid Interest for static or existing data The tar-
get Data packets do not require real-time processing; for in-
stance, the Data packet carrying a static CSS file or a video
chunk. Type I-1 attacks can be naturally mitigated by NDN’s
Interest aggregation and in-network cache as we discussed
in Section 3.2.3 and Section 3.2.3. However, as analyzed
and shown in Section 7.1, when flooding Interests to a large
enough number of names, the effect of Interest aggregation
and in-network cache becomes insufficient.
I-2: Invalid Interests When attackers send large volumes
of Interests that cannot be satisfied by the producer, we con-
sider such traffic to be invalid. Some possible reasons could
be (i) the Interest format is incorrect (e.g., unexpected name
components, invalid Interest signature) and (ii) the target
Data packets are non-existent and can never be generated
when sent in large volumes. This type of Interest is mostly
useful to malicious adversaries. One possible way for at-
tackers to generate such Interests is to append non-existent
name components (e.g., garbled text generated randomly) to
valid server prefixes. Since I-2 Interest names can be arbi-
trary and there is no target Data packets, Interest aggregation
and caching cannot mitigate such attacks.
I-3: Valid Interests for dynamically-generated data
When an Interest for dynamically-generated Data arrives, the
server needs to process the requests (e.g., database queries,
calculations, etc.) before it can generate Data and reply back.
For example, a legitimate Interest name may contain variable
components and thus there are no preexisting Data packets to
match it. In this case, the server will need to process the re-
quest first and then generate a Data packet following with a
reply. Since the Interest’s name is customized and the Data
is generated in real time, hardly any Interests arriving at a
forwarder would hit a pending Interest with the same name
or a previously cached Data packet, so NDN itself does not
effectively mitigate such attacks.
4 Fine-grained Interest Traffic Throttling
To address the attack surface of Interest flooding and to en-
able data sources to identify and push fine-grained network
remediation to attack sources, we present FITT. In this sec-
tion, we use the topology shown in Figure 5 to help ex-
plain the attack scenarios and the FITT design. The server S
runs an NDN producer application and serves the data prefix
P“/univ1/service/email”, which is the target of a DDoS
attack. The clients C1 to C6 are consumer nodes. We let
C1,C2,C3 to be compromised IoT devices in a botnet, e.g.
Mirai, and C4, C5, and C6 to be legitimate clients. The
routers R1 to R5 are routers that support NDN’s network
stack. Importantly, these routers may be deployed as an over-
lay topology over the real world IP topology. Based on the
Data packet flows, we call the routers towards the server “up-
stream routers” and routers towards the clients “downstream
routers”, e.g., R4 and R5 are downstream routers of R3.
Goals Our proposed system aims to defend not only from I-2
attacks, but also from I-1 attacks, I-3 attacks, and mixed at-
tacks (mix of I-1, I-2, I-3) in an effective way without affect-
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Figure 5: An example FITT topology as an overlay of cur-
rent TCP/IP network
ing legitimate clients and the traffic under another prefix. For
example, in our example topology, when the email service
“/univ1/service/email” is under attack, our proposed ap-
proach should throttle the DDoS traffic away from the email
service only, at the same time, legitimate traffic from clients
under other prefixes (e.g., “/univ1/service/video”) should
not be affected (even if that traffic is from attacking clients).
Assumptions The FITT design is based on the following as-
sumptions that we argue are either reasonable or easy to be
realized.
• Victim S is best able to know its capacity to process in-
coming Interests under a specific prefix.
The server’s capacity can be easily obtained based on the
provisioned memory, CPU and other resources versus the
time/space complexity of processing the Interest requests
under the prefix.
• The server S (the victim) is best able to know whether it is
under a DDoS attack, the prefix that is under attack, and
whether an Interest is fake or valid.
The victim server inherently has the most accurate judg-
ments of a DDoS attack: By simply inspecting whether
Interests under a prefix overwhelm the processing power,
S knows whether prefix is under attack. Moreover, the
server may immediately know whether an Interest is fake
or not when processing it because a fake Interest cannot
fetch a Data.
• A node knows whether it is a FITT edge router.
In FITT, an edge router is either (i) a gateway router to
which clients are connected or (ii) a far-most router from
the DDoS victim that supports FITT and NDN in incre-
mental deployment cases. This can easily be configured
by the Internet Service Provider (ISP) at the network level
(e.g. CPE, SOHO router, etc.) or by the device vendor
(e.g., IoT vendor) at the overlaid NDN level. The infor-
mation can also be obtained through automatic means; for
example, to learn whether it is connected to a client or not,
the router can check the hop count of incoming packets
from that interface.
4.1 A Design Overview
FITT is designed to be running on each NDN forwarder as
a NDN forwarding strategy1. Utilizing the topology in Fig-
ure 5, FITT works in a way that after receiving DDoS feed-
back (carried in a NACK packet from the victim S), the router
R1 analyzes the feedback and triggers the FITT reaction. By
checking the incoming interfaces stored in the PIT, R1 will
trace back to the DDoS traffic sender routers R2 and R3 and
notify them by NACK packets. R2 and R3 will perform the
similar procedures as R1 does. In this way, FITT pushes re-
mediation from S all the way to edger routers like R2 and R4
where exact traffic senders are connected. The edge routers
will first notify these clients by NACKs and perform Interest
throttling on suspect downstream interfaces within the spe-
cific prefix reported by S. During the traffic throttling, an
edge router will check whether a client has changed its be-
havior following the NACK or not (i.e. whether it lowers
down its sending rate to the required value under the speci-
fied prefix). The router can then relax or reinforce the limit,
accordingly.
Victim 
Gateway 
Router
NACK from the victim
FITT 
NACK NACK
Downstream 
Interfaces
Upstream 
Interface
……
Edge Edge Edge Edge
Figure 6: FITT System Overview
Multiple FITT reactions can be triggered at the same time
for different traffic prefixes (located on the same server or
different servers) and different types of attacks. When mul-
tiple reactions take place, for a specific traffic flow under the
prefix and from a suspect interface, a FITT edge router will
take the minimum allowed traffic value to perform the throt-
tling.
1In an NDN forwarding module, forwarding strategies decide the for-
warding operations. Adding a new forwarding strategy requires no modifi-
cation to the forwarding module design
6
4.2 Explicit Feedback from the Victim
A FITT reaction is triggered by a victim’s NACK packet.
To be more specific, a NACK packet created by the victim
server and sent downstream will carry the following infor-
mation:
• RSN: The reason code used to notify routers whether the
victim is under fake Interest (I-2) attack FAKE or valid
Interest (I-1 or I-3) attack/overload VALID.
• PREF : The prefix under which the overwhelming traffic
comes to the victim.
• C: The receiving rate of valid Interests that the server can
handle currently under the prefix PREF . We call the num-
ber capacity. The capacity is carried in a NACK only in
case of valid Interest overload.
• FakeList: Fake Interest name list for fake Interest attack
only. The list contains fake Interest names under the pre-
fix PREF that a server received within the last unit time
interval which is defined by the server. Optimizations can
be applied to reduce the space complexity by (i) sampling
the list, (ii) utilizing Bloom Filter [12], or (iii) regular ex-
pression
4.3 Pushing Back to Exact Sources
After receiving a FITT NACK, the router closest to the vic-
tim will first check the RSN field and trigger different types
of reactions.
If RSN = FAKE, the router will first check NACK’s
FakeList and find out the corresponding PIT entries whose
Interest name is in the FakeList. Through these entries, the
router learns the exact incoming interfaces of the fake Inter-
ests. For each of these interfaces i, the router will generate
a new fake Interest name list FakeListi which only contains
FakeList’s fake Interest names that were sent from interface
i. After that, the router sends each interface i a new NACK
carrying the RSN, PREF , and FakeListi.
If RSN = VALID, there is no FakeList carried in the
NACK. Different from the reaction to a fake Interest attack,
since both attackers and legitimate clients send valid Inter-
ests, the router cannot distinguish the good traffic from the
offending. Consequently, the router will check all the cur-
rent pending Interests under the prefix PREF and get a set of
suspect incoming interfaces. The router will then calculate a
weight wi for each suspect interface i to distribute the C to
these interfaces. Since a router do not have the knowledge of
the clients behind each interface (i.e., how many end hosts
are behind each interface, whether these hosts are attackers
or not), FITT adopts the simplest way of equally share the
weight to all suspect interfaces:
wi =
1
Num Suspect
(1)
where Num Suspect denotes the number of the suspect inter-
faces. As described in Section 5.4, the reinforcement throt-
tling will help to further identify attacking traffic and amend
the potential unfairness caused by the equal share. After
that, for each suspect interface i, the router then computes
the weighted capacity Ci = wi×C and sends a new NACK
carrying new capacity value Ci as well as RSN and prefix
PREF .
All the procedures mentioned above are within the prefix
PREF reported by the victim, traffic under other prefixes will
not be counted in.
In this way, all the routers along the Interest sending path
recursively receive and generate new NACKs that will be
propagated to further downstream routers. Finally, the DDoS
report that originated from the server will arrive at all FITT
edge routers.
4.4 Reinforcement Traffic Throttling
When a FITT edge router receives a NACK from the up-
stream, it will perform traffic throttling to downstream in-
terfaces (connecting to the clients or further routers) where
DDoS traffic is from. To be specific, the router will first cal-
culate the permitted sending rate Limiti for each interface i
under the prefix P as follow.
Limiti =

Ci, if i is suspicious when RSN = VALID
0, if i is suspicious when RSN = FAKE
∞, if i is not suspicious
In case of RSN = VALID, similar to other FITT routers,
the router will calculate the assigned capacity Ci. When
RSN = FAKE, FITT doesn’t tolerate any fake Interest (I-2)
and imposes zero permitted Interest sending rate under the
prefix P.
The router then sends a NACK packet to each suspect in-
terface as a notification. After the notifications, the edge
router then starts throttling traffic by randomly dropping In-
terest packets to ensure:
∀i ∈ range(1,n) Rate(i, P) ≤ Limiti
where Rate(i, p) is the Interest sending rate from interface
i and under prefix PREF and Limiti is the allowed traffic
sending rate for the interface i.
Once receiving a NACK from the gateway router, legiti-
mate clients will comply and lower down their sending rate
of the Interests under the prefix PREF , while the bots may
not obey the rules, prompting the router to perform reinforce-
ment throttling. In case of valid Interest (I-1 or I-3) attack,
the router will monitor the sending rate of each suspicious
client and perform the following control:
• If a sender lowers its Interest sending rate Rate(i, p) down
to Limiti, the router will remove the throttling over this
client.
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• If a sender does not follow the control, the router will reset
the limit to 12 ×Limiti.
All the throttling is within the DDoS traffic flow defined
by the prefix PREF . This is how FITT squelches DDoS traf-
fic at the source while still letting the sources communicate
to other services (names).
4.5 Timers in FITT
FITT requires routers to keep the FITT records when pushing
NACKs down to edges and when edge servers perform the
throttling. FITT utilizes two types of timers RevertTimer
and RateLimitTimer. These timers limit the overhead of
FITT and will not affect the final result of the FITT reaction.
Different routers can set these two timers differently based
on their own needs.
A RevertTimer decides how long a router should keep the
DDoS Records. The timer is set when a new NACK arrives.
Whenever a new NACK arrives, the router checks whether
there is an existing RevertTimer for the FITT reaction with
the same reason RSN and same prefix PREF . If yes, the
router will update the timer instead of creating a new one.
A RateLimitTimer is maintained by edge routers only. It
decides how long it takes for a router to decide whether an in-
dividual is well-behaving or not. After the RateLimitTimer,
the gateway router will remove the limit of “good” clients
and strengthen the limit of bad ones. This timer is period-
ically reset until all clients either behave well or move into
the black list.
5 FITT Design Rationale
FITT directly makes use of NDN’s properties to combat
DDoS in the following ways:
• Utilizing structured names at the network layer allows
FITT to perform service-level, per-prefix, reaction and
monitoring.
• Stateful forwarding provides exact information about the
traffic so that FITT can accurately identify suspicious
clients.
• Remediating traffic at sources alleviates network conges-
tion and capacity concerns of data producers and inter-
mediate network infrastructure (like Internet eXchange
Points, IXPs, etc.).
5.1 Victim’s Feedback enables Accuracy
The explicit feedback enables FITT to perform fine-grained
DDoS mitigation. To be specific, the prefix PREF helps
FITT narrow the target traffic scope and the capacity C can
inform the downstream routers about the percentage volume
of traffic that should be controlled in case of valid Inter-
est (I-1 or I-3) overwhelm. Moreover, hearing the feedback
also makes the reaction more accurate: NACK’s RSN helps
routers to learn the attack type and take different actions
accordingly. In case of fake Interest attacks, by tracking
the incoming interfaces of the Interests listed in FakeList,
routers are able to directly identify the attackers and com-
pletely block them.
Since the design is built to mitigate DDoS for a variety of
prefixes and types of Interest Attacks, FITT is able to han-
dle complex scenarios. For example, more than one victim
server can send multiple NACKs containing different pre-
fixes and different reasons.
5.2 Minimizing Collateral Damage by Fine
Granularity
The fundamental benefit of the fine granularity of FITT is
twofold: (i) By explicitly setting PREF in a NACK, FITT
squelches the traffic to PREF only. All the other services
provided by the victim server will not be affected. (ii) FITT
throttles traffic sent by a suspect client to the prefix PREF
only, letting the clients communicate to other services.
Considering the example in Figure 5, we assume the
“/univ1/service/email” is under attack, FITT will limit the
traffic to this service to the expected volume C, which are
configured by S, or block the traffic consisting of fake Inter-
est (I-2). In the throttling, non-attacking clients like C4 and
C5 can use the service “/univ1/service/video” as normal,
reducing the collateral damage on S’s services that are not
attacked.
Using the same example, we assume C3 is a compromised
smart home device, e.g., a home camera. Though C3 is com-
promised to send attack traffic to S, FITT is able to stop its
DDoS traffic and at the same time, does not bother its normal
functions. For example, it can still upload the surveillance
video records to the smart home controller.
5.3 Distributed Throttling at Sources
In our design, only FITT edge routers play the role of rate
limiting. This is because, on one hand, we cannot trust a
client’s device to take actions - it could be compromised
as well. On the other hand, an upstream router should not
perform rate limiting for the following reasons: (i) When
the traffic volume under a target prefix increases, upstream
routers don’t have enough knowledge to tell whether it is be-
cause of the misbehaving downstream routers or new clients
have joined. (ii) When legitimate clients are behind a down-
stream router, compared with edge routers, upstream router
actions will also hurt legitimate clients. Note that this is one
reason why attempts to remediate DDoS in IP networks (us-
ing FlowSpec, RTBH, etc.) suffer and are often maligned,
because of the collateral damage that can result from their
use.
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In cases when an edge router is connected to downstream
routers or clients that are not equipped with NDN and FITT,
our proposed approach still reduces the attack surface by re-
inforcing the limitation on the suspect traffic. Because FITT
may cause collateral damage to the legitimate clients behind
the edge routers (since clients can’t be reached in this case)
FITT uses best-effort to mitigate the DDoS traffic to the vic-
tim.
5.4 Monitoring Further Identifies Attackers
After an edge router sends out NACKs to suspicious clients,
we believe that the legitimate clients will obey the DDoS
control and lower their sending rate of Interests accordingly
while attackers may not abide by this. It is possible that bots
may use intelligence to analyze and attempt to circumvent
the NACK, but FITT already succeeds if the bots cannot in-
crease Interest sending rate, thus greatly reducing damage.
Essentially, FITT forces bad entities to comply.
In valid Interest attack scenarios, a router calculates the
weight by simply equally distributed the capacity among
all suspect interfaces by equation 1, which may potentially
cause unfair capacity assignment to clients. For example, C1
and C2 in Figure 5 will be assigned more capacity than C3
and C4 in a valid Interest attack reaction because C1 and C2
are closer to the victim in the topology, thus having larger
weight. Though there is potential for unfairness, the moni-
toring will help FITT to further restrict the attacking traffic
and relax the limit on legitimate traffic by adjusting the throt-
tling to be fair. As shown in simulation results in Section 7.3,
the reinforcement will quickly block all attacking traffic and
let legitimate traffic recover from the throttling.
6 Incremental Deployment of FITT
Service
Server
The Internet
FITT 
Reaction
Edge 
Sources
Edge 
Sources
Edge 
Sources IP Edge
Figure 7: An Example Topology
NDN and FITT present an option for immediate incre-
mental deployment, which elevates many of their advan-
tages to near-term objectives. In general, incremental de-
ployment models become more realistic when they align
their costs with incentives. That is, those who deploy new
mechanisms are more likely to do so when they anticipate
direct benefits from doing so. By contrast, deployments like
ingress and egress filtering (BCP-38 [17] and BCP-84 [10])
illustrate slow adoption, arguably, because those deploying
them do not gain any direct benefits. Conversely, service
providers already expend resources and money to combat
DDoS by either provisioning large amounts of excess band-
width or by contracting with commercial DDoS mitigation
providers [2, 31, 14]. Service providers whose applications
may already be in a position to benefit from migrating to
NDN’s architecture would gain additional benefits by de-
ploying NDN with FITT and thereby being able to shed
large amounts of DDoS traffic. In an incremental deploy-
ment, the overlay NDN routers and two ends speaking NDN
are enough for FITT to effectuate the DDoS mitigation, as
shown in Figure 7. What’s more, service operators who mi-
grate their services to NDN bolster each others’ NDN de-
ployments, as those clients independently augment each oth-
ers’ deployments (through facilities like shared caching and
shared routing infrastructure). In particular, we observe that
serendipitous IoT deployments of NDN, which may already
be underway, could benefit other services whose providers
have (or will) independently embraced NDN for this rea-
son. That is, an NDN-enabled service may shed DDoS traffic
from would-be attack nodes that might otherwise be bots in
Mirai. IoT deployment of NDN would put the FITT mitiga-
tion machinery very near to some of the Internets most vo-
luminous DDoS sources for all NDN applications (not just
IoT). We believe that it is demonstrably feasible for inde-
pendent service operators to overcome network protocol os-
sification and migrate (at least portions) of their production
traffic to NDN.
6.1 Overcoming Ossification
A common lament in the Internet has been that network pro-
tocols evolve very slowly, or tend to be ossified [5]. Recent
deployment successes in other network protocols [24] has il-
lustrated that this impasse can be overcome by providers who
control (i.e. implement and deploy) both ends of a service
(the client and server sides). When implementing mobile
apps, the provider has the ability to choose both ends of the
network protocol. While applications that depend solely on
web browsers must often remain backward-compatible with
TCP/IP, mobile clients can often implement service-specific
code. The deployment of Google’s QUIC [24] provides a
timely example of this flexibility.
In that case, deployment grew quickly with Googles own-
ership of the transactions.2 Legacy TCP support was main-
tained, but QUIC was treated as preferred where QUIC-
compatible clients were used. We observe that this tactic
is equally available to NDN, through mobile applications.
As a migration path, and to maintain backward compatibil-
ity, service providers could bifurcate their deployments and
2Google was able to implement QUIC on its mobile platforms and its
Chrome browser, but maintained TCP/IP support for other browsers.
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offer TCP/IP services on separate infrastructure. Then, un-
der cases like large DDoS attacks, TCP/IP could be serviced
by different infrastructure, and all NDN/FITT infrastructure
could remain unencumbered by attack traffic, while TCP/IP
remediations are enacted on the legacy infrastructure.
6.2 Using IoT to Bootstrap
With increasing attention being paid to the NDN architec-
tures utility to problem-spaces like IoT and smart-homes [9,
3, 4, 40], grass-roots deployments of NDN may already be
beginning. IoT, in particular, represents a fortuitous oppor-
tunity because there would be strategic advantages to hav-
ing NDN’s and FITT’s protections in front of devices that
have historically participated in some of the Internet’s largest
DDoS attacks [6]. This possibility could be attainable in the
near term because in the IoT space, it is not uncommon for
firmware upgrades to be automated and consumers to update
their “infrastructure” more often, and the device lifetimes
are often shorter than some network infrastructure (like core
routers, DNS infrastructure, CDN caches, etc.). Such a set-
ting could suggest that a measurably aggressive deployment
of new devices is feasible, and NDN deployments could
grow more quickly than in other settings. What’s more, the
ability of NDN and FITT to address DDoS in the network
could be seen as an incentive model for IoT developers to
embrace security in their development by simply choosing
the NDN network architecture.
As such deployments grow, this could present a serendipi-
tous opportunity for other NDN and FITT deployments. For
example, consider a product line of refrigerators that were
to be deployed using NDN for their communications, and
only support TCP/IP for legacy communications (to ensure
reachability in the home). These refrigerators could still be
scanned, compromised, and become bots in a Mirai botnet
(through their TCP/IP stack). These devices, may, therefore,
still be enslaved into participating in DDoS attacks. How-
ever, if an unrelated email service were receiving DDoS traf-
fic from those devices, and were to move to NDN with FITT,
the IoT devices would be able to transact with that same ser-
vice over NDN instead of TCP/IP. At that point, the device
would have the FITT mitigation machinery right next to the
attack traffic, and the NDN service could quell the DDoS
traffic from it.
7 Evaluation of NDN’s DDoS Resilience and
FITT
We implement FITT in C++ over ndnSIM [28], which is
a NDN simulation platform based on NS-3. The network
topology that we use for our experimentation and evaluation
has four Autonomous Systems (ASes) with meshed connec-
tions. “/univ1/cs/server/email” is the prefix that is under
attack and the service provider is node “/univ1/cs/server”.
We assume the server is globally reachable, which means all
users, even outside the server’s local network, have means to
learn the name. For sake of simplicity, we will just call the
target prefix P in rest of the section.
In the simulation result plots, we use the red dashed line to
represent attackers’ sending rate, the blue solid line to repre-
sent P’s receiving traffic rate, the green dotdash line to rep-
resent legitimate clients’ sending rate.
We first demonstrate NDN’s DDoS resilience to I-1 In-
terest attack and then evaluate FITT. The simulations results
show that after the DDoS starts, FITT can effectively con-
trol the traffic to the victim as expected within seconds (less
than 2 seconds under our simulation settings), and ensure
that over 99% of the attack target(s) incoming traffic is from
legitimate clients after a short period of time.
7.1 NDN’s DDoS resilience to I-1 Attack
Figure 8 demonstrates NDN’s DDoS resilience to I-1 Interest
attack with the help of Interest Aggregation and in-network
caching.
(a) 500 v.s. 100 Names; No Cache (b) 500 v.s. 1000 Names; 200 Cache
Simulation Settings: 60 attackers are located across all the ASes with no
FITT deployed. Each attacker start sending I-1 attacking Interests at 100
Interests/s from second 3. We simulate NDN’s resilience with target’s
available Data names to be 1000 and 500.
Figure 8: NDN’s DDoS Resilience to I-1 Interest Attack
We first disabled cache in all routers so that the result will
only be affected by NDN’s Interest aggregation. As shown
in Figure 8a, Interest aggregation can withhold traffic from
attackers (red dotted line) to the server (blue solid line). We
then introduced cache to see how it can suppress traffic even
more. As shown in Figure 8b, it is apparent that the num-
ber of Interests reaching P decreases because of the caching
capacity (i.e. forwarder’s Content Store), which is because
intermediate nodes along the path will serve future same In-
terests with cached Data (the freshness of cached Data is 4
seconds in our simulation).
The two figures indicates that the effect of Interest aggre-
gation and cache is lower when an attacker can use a bigger
set of Interest names to attack the victim. This is because
larger the name set, smaller the chance of two Interests car-
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rying the same name and smaller the chance to hit a previous
cached Data packets.
7.2 FITT: Fake Interest Attack
(a) Fake Interest DDoS Attack (b) Legitimate Traffic Percentage
Simulation Settings: There are 60 attackers with sending rate 100
Interests/s and 12 legitimate clients with sending rate 40 Interests/s across
all the ASes. I-1 attacking Interests starts from second 3.
Figure 9: FITT: Fake Interest Attack
We first study FITT’s performance against fake Interest (I-
2) DDoS attack. As shown in Figure 9a, initially, P only re-
ceives Interests from legitimate clients (green dotdash line).
After second 3, attackers start the DDoS by sending I-2 In-
terests to P(the red dashed line goes to 6000 Interests/s). As
depicted by the plot, FITT eliminate the DDoS traffic in sec-
onds and P’s receiving traffic line soon merges the legiti-
mate clients’ outgoing traffic line, meaning good traffic from
doesn’t get affected. The effectiveness is because in fake
Interest attack, FITT can accurately identify attackers and
throttle their traffic flows under the specific prefix. Figure 9b
shows that after FITT reaction, all the traffic received by P is
from legitimate clients.
7.3 FITT: Valid Interest Attack
The simulation results of the valid Interest Attack are shown
in Figure 10. Different from the fake Interest attack simu-
lations, after the reaction, since both legitimate clients and
attackers send out valid Interest packets, as we discussed in
Section 4, the router cannot tell good traffic from bad traf-
fic. Therefore both legitimate clients and attackers will be
limited. After receiving the FITT NACK, legitimate clients
will abide by the control placed and lower down their send-
ing rate until the router determines them to be legitimate and
free the limits, explaining why the green dotdash line goes
down in the first several seconds of the attack and then back
to the normal later. As for attackers, as shown, the traffic
received by the victim drops periodically (every 3 seconds),
which confirms the FITT’s reinforcement throttling: FITT
will halve the limit on attackers until all the attackers’ traffic
to the reported prefix are totally blocked At the end of the
(a) Valid Interest DDoS Attack (b) Legitimate Traffic Percentage
Simulation Settings: Using the same simulation settings as Figure 9,
attackers send valid (I-1 and I-3) Interests to P from second 3. We let the
victim’s capacity of handling Interests under P to be 1500 Interests/s and
RateLimitTimer to be 3 seconds.
Figure 10: FITT: Valid Interest Attack
Pushback, almost all the Interests received by the victims are
from legitimate clients (Figure 10b).
7.4 FITT: Mixed Interest Attack
(a) Mixed Interest DDoS Attack (b) Legitimate Traffic Percentage
Simulation Settings: Using the same simulation settings as Figure 10,
attackers send both fake and valid Interests after the DDoS starts.
Figure 11: FITT: Mixed Interest Attack
Figure 11 shows how FITT handle mixed Interest attack
where attackers will send both fake and valid Interests to-
wards the server. One obvious difference from the fake and
valid Interest attack scenarios is that, after the attack starts,
FITT will limit the traffic to be much lower than the black
line (the tolerance plus the capacity plus the good Interests).
This is because the edge routers will take the smaller value
from the limits for fake Interest attack reaction and valid In-
terest attack reaction. Similar as the valid Interest attack sce-
nario, after a short time period, FITT will place the limit to
misbehaving clients only and the legitimate clients will re-
cover. As shown, in the end, FITT will only pass legitimate
traffic to the server (Figure 11b).
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7.5 FITT: Multiple DDoS to Different Prefixes
Previous plots indicate that FITT works well with all types of
Interest attacks, keeping the traffic well below the thresholds
when there is one victim that is under attack. FITT is also
designed to be able to handle multiple DDoS attacks (i.e.,
attacks to different prefixes, started at different times, using
different types of Interests) at the same time. To evaluate
FITT’s performance in multiple-DDoS cases, we use valid
Interest attack as an example. Using the same topology set-
tings, we let half of the attackers attack prefix P starting from
second 2 and another half attack the another server P′ start-
ing from second 4. Note that P and P′ can be located on the
same node or different nodes. We set the capacity to be 750
for both servers so that the attacking traffic (3000 Interest/s
for each victim) will trigger the FITT reactions.
(a) Valid Interest DDoS to P and P′ (b) Throttling Traffic to P Only
Figure 12: FITT: Fake Interest Attack with 2 Victims
As shown, when multiple FITT reactions take place, FITT
can effectively control the DDoS traffic from both attacks at
the same time. For each victim server, the incoming Interests
are throttled in the similar way as that when there is only
one victim server under attack. Two servers’ incoming traffic
lines quickly go below the threshold after the attack started
and soon merge the legitimate client traffic line and finally
all the traffic received by the two servers are from legitimate
clients.
7.6 FITT: Throttling Granularity
In DDoS mitigation, collateral damage may ruin the legiti-
mate traffic sent from the compromised devices. As a real-
world example, IoT devices compromised as part of the Mi-
rai botnet will generate attacking traffic to the DDoS target,
but these IoT devices still function as expected, e.g., a smart
home device still communicate with the IoT service provider
normally. FITT throttles Interest traffic at a granularity of the
name prefix.
We evaluate FITT in terms of the granularity of the traffic
throttling. We simulate that 60 clients are compromised to at-
tack the P with 100 Interests/s sending rate; at the same time,
the clients keep the normal communication with another ser-
vice provider P′ at the reasonable rate of 20 Interests/s. In
this case, the attacking traffic will overwhelm P but the legit-
imate traffic will not go beyond the capacity of P′. As shown
in the Figure 12b, compared with the two-victim scenario
where traffic to both P and P′ will be throttled, FITT only
squelches clients’ traffic under P while the traffic towards P′
will not be affected.
8 Discussion
8.1 Authenticity of Victim’s FITT NACK
Authenticity of the feedback is of vital importance since
FITT relies on victim’s explicit feedback to start a reaction.
In cases when attackers send fake NACKs to abuse FITT
to deny good services, the router can easily detects such at-
tacks by comparing the reported prefix with the routing pre-
fix of the interface where NACK was received. For exam-
ple, in topology 5, when router R1 receives a NACK from
the link that connects S, reporting that the prefix “/isp0
/service” is under attack. Assuming in R1’s routing table
only prefix “/univ1” is registered on the interface towards S,
R1 can drop the NACK because “/isp0/service” cannot be
matched. Another approach to ensure NACK’s authenticity
is to let the victim server appends a digital signature to the
NACK, which requires the pre-configured trust model and
key distribution between the server and the network.
8.2 Misbehaving Routers in FITT
In FITT’s design, we don’t have the assumption that all the
NDN routers are trustworthy and perform FITT properly.
However, it is possible that illegitimate routers (e.g., free
WiFi access point deployed by attackers) will not forward
NACKs or not throttle the attacking traffic at all. To handle
the evil routers, service providers should carefully set which
nodes to be edge routers. For example, in the Figure 5, if R4
is not a trustworthy router (e.g., is not fully controlled by the
service provider), the service provider can set the R3 as the
FITT edge router. In this case, even though R4 does nothing
to combat the DDoS attack, the R3 will throttle the traffic
sent from R4, including both attacking traffic from C3 and
legitimate traffic from C4. Therefore, misbehaving routers
will not ruin FITT’s performance but degrade the granularity
of the traffic throttling.
8.3 Comparison with Previous Solutions
As we discussed in Section 2, existing DDoS mitigation so-
lutions for TCP/IP networks either (i) base DDoS traffic sig-
nature on matching criteria from network headers (e.g., IETF
dots, Pushback, BGP FlowSpec, RTBH), or (ii) add addi-
tional features to the network architecture for finer flow clas-
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sification (e.g., AITF, SIFF, StopIt, TVA). Due to strict lay-
ering, identifying specific application-level traffic flows is
unattainable.
By contrast, NDN enables FITT to identify and throttle
specific application-level DDoS traffic flows at fine granular-
ity by leveraging NDN’s architectural features– (i) applica-
tion-semantic meaningful names and (ii) stateful forwarding,
victim is able to report the DDoS at name prefix granularity,
and FITT is able to identify exact application-level attack
traffic flows and attackers at the network level (as shown in
the simulation scenario in 7.6).
There have also been various proposed approaches to mit-
igate Interest DDoS over NDN/ICN. Specifically, [1, 15]
leverage the “success ratio” (how many Interests get satis-
fied by Data) to detect a presence of fake Interest DDoS.
[16, 34] propose to detect Interest flooding by monitoring
the PIT size or PIT utilization rate. They mainly focus on
one specific type of attack – I-2 Interest attack (i.e. Inter-
ests carrying false data names). To be effective, they also
require routers must be able to set proper threshold values
for the detection function, and these threshold values can be
non-trivial to configure when underlying traffic composition
is complex. In comparison, FITT directly takes input from
attack targets and can handle valid Interest (i.e. I-1 and I-
3 Interests towards existent or dynamically generated data)
DDoS and mixed Interest attack scenarios where attackers
can send both fake and valid Interests towards the target.
The explicit feedback from the victim enables accurate traf-
fic throttling and reinforcement rate limiting to misbehaving
consumers, removing the need to configure proper threshold
values.
9 Conclusion
DDoS attacks have been an asymmetric threat since they first
became significant, roughly 20 years ago. In that time, we
have seen an increasing trend of application-specific TTPs,
most clearly visible in reflective amplification attacks that
use application semantics. As the IP network architecture is
being abused to facilitate distributed attacks, our mitigation
techniques and defenses have struggled with fundamental
misalignments between the essential functions and forward-
ing semantics needed for effective mitigation and IP’s state-
less forwarding, to address and remediate the traffic from
large DDoS attacks. Although many solutions have been
proposed to add those missing components, misalignments
of incentives make their rollout difficult. Consequently, the
current mitigation techniques necessarily backhaul DDoS
attack traffic across the Internet to centralized mitigation
servers that do DPI. This results in congesting links, costing
operational overhead, and framing an unmaintainable capac-
ity mismatch (in which transit capacity of centralized mitiga-
tion must match the aggregate DDoS traffic from distributed
attack sources). The ability to remediate DDoS attacks close
to their sources has been among the goals that have long been
sought after.
In this work, we have illustrated how an architectural
change can lead to effective solutions to DDoS mitigation,
a challenge that has faced Internet for at least 20 years. Our
solution, called FITT, utilizes NDN’s basic properties and
fundamentally (and architecturally) addresses the TTPs of
the Internet’s largest DDoS attacks, like those from the Mi-
rai botnet. By utilizing NDN’s stateful forwarding and struc-
tured names, FITT is capable of actively responding to all
three types of Interest flooding. Evidence from our effort to
mitigate the Interest flooding suggests that NDN provides a
solid foundation for DDoS defense. As next step, we plan to
add the FITT forwarding strategy into the NDN forwarding
module implementation [35, 40] and perform a live deploy-
ment of FITT over both the NDN testbed [30] and in NDN’s
experimental IoT edge networks.
What’s more, our analysis also shows that NDN’s archi-
tectural design is incrementally deployable today, allows in-
dependent edge-in deployments to natively work together,
leading toward inherent DDoS resilience. The incremen-
tal deployment path for NDN with FITT could reasonably
be expected to put DDoS defense mechanisms directly in
front of major sources of DDoS, and would let applications
directly instruct the network to squelch DDoS traffic at its
sources.
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